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held that the trial judge's refusal to appoint experts to examine
the defendant, who alleged present insanity as a stay to the ex-
ecution, was a proper exercise of judicial discretion. The court
held that the procedure set out in Article 267 of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure was applicable to and governed all pleas of in-
sanity in criminal cases. It stressed the provision that the court's
obligation to appoint disinterested experts to inquire into the
sanity of the accused is limited to cases where it "has reasonable
ground to believe" that the defendant is insane or mentally de-
ficient. In the case at bar, each of the witnesses, upon whom de-
fense counsel had relied in urging present insanity, had stated
when questioned by the trial judge that he felt the prisoner was
perfectly sane.
II. TORTS
WEX S. MALONE*
Tort Liability Between Spouses
The problem of tort liability between husband and wife has
given rise to confusion and differences of opinion everywhere.
In common law jurisdictions the problem is stated simply as one
of responsibility: can the husband (or wife) be made liable to
the other spouse, or, does their marital relationship preclude tort
actions between themselves?' The Louisiana court apparently
has assumed that this question is to be answered in favor of
liability, but it has given the problem a different and difficult
twist by positing the issue in terms of community property. Both
spouses share in the benefits of the community, and successful
damage actions in favor of either of them usually accrue to the
community.2 For this reason it has been urged that a recovery
by one spouse against the insurer of the other for damages occa-
sioned by the latter's negligence will result in allowing the tor-
tious spouse, who participates in the community, to benefit by
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (1941) § 99.
2. Apparently damages for personal injury to the wife resulting in loss
of earnings enter the community if she was living with her husband at the
time of the injury, while other damages for personal injury are her separate
property. See Kientz v. Charles Dennery, Inc., 17 So.(2d) 506 (La. App. 1944),
noted in (1944) 19 Tulane L. Rev. 141.
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his or her own wrongdoing. This result is alleged to be in viola-
tion of public policy and to offer a compelling reason for the
refusal of relief.
The above argument was presented to the supreme court
recently in the case, McHenry v. American Employers' Insurance
Company.3 The evidence in the controversy showed that while
McHenry was standing in the driveway to his residence he was
struck by an automobile which was negligently driven by his
wife, who at that time was acting within the course of her em-
ployment and was covered by her employer's automobile liability
insurance. McHenry's damage bill was in excess of seven thou-
sand dollars, including loss of wages, impairment of future earn-
ing capacity, medical expenses and pain and suffering. The court
chose to admit that any recovery that would enrich the com-
munity shared by the negligent wife would be in violation of
public policy. It avoided most of the implications of this position,
however, by holding that the damages claimed by McHenry
would not enrich the community; they would merely reimburse
it. This, said the court, falls short of producing the undesirable
consequences complained of by defendant.
The writer suggests that this decision fails as a straight-
forward attack on the problem which faced the court, that the
distinction drawn bears no real relationship to the merits of the
controversy, and that the position taken by the court may require
the drawing of further tenuous distinctions before the state of
the law can be made clear.
Let us consider briefly the court's concession that a recovery
by the husband which enriches the community is in violation of
public policy because it enables the tortious wife to profit by
her own wrong. The corollary of this proposition would be that
a refusal of recovery would better serve public policy. But is
this true? Is it not likewise against public policy to deny recovery
to anyone who is the innocent victim of the negligence of another?
Was not the husband as much injured here as though he had been
struck by a stranger, or is his need for compensation less urgent
because of the fact that the malefactor was his wife? There
appears no sound reason why the ethical policy urged by the
defendant is so valuable that it must be purchased at the expense
of the innocent tort victim; unless it could be said that the hus-
band is vicariously responsible for the torts of his wife even when
they are committed upon himself, or unless it could be urged
that by the marriage he has in some mysterious manner agreed
3. 206 La. 70, 18 So.(2d) 656 (1944).
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impliedly to share her individual losses with her. The inescap-
able conclusion is that some public policy will be violated whether
recovery is granted or refused. Which policy is the more valu-
able to the law? This was the real issue with which the court
was faced.
Perhaps the answer as to which public policy must be sacrificed
is not clear, or perhaps recovery in such situations should not be
allowed because of the great likelihood that insurance companies
will thereby be subjected to collusive claims and simulated lia-
bility. This consideration has prompted other courts to deny
recovery by one spouse against the insurer of the other 4 Never-
theless the court sought (unsuccessfully, it is believed) to avoid
the problem before it by holding that a recovery by the injured
spouse would not be violative of public policy unless the com-
munity were thereby enriched-that a recoupment of loss to the
community was not enough. The drawing of this tenuous dis-
tinction not only precluded a direct attack on the real problem
outlined above; it likewise created a wholly inconsequential and
spurious issue which cannot but be productive of considerable
confusion in future litigation.
Let it be assumed that the tortious spouse must not be per-
mitted to better herself through her own wrongdoing. Such a
policy is supported entirely on notions of ethics and propriety,
not ideas of property. It is wholly unimportant whether we say
that she shall not gain advantage by her wrong, that she shall
not benefit by it, or that she shall not profit by it. Ethical con-
siderations do not admit such specious distinctions. If the secur-
ing of the judgment by the husband substantially betters her
position in any way, this should be enough to bring her situation
within the purview of the rule. Thus the wife who at common
law is entitled only to her claim for support is substantially bene-
fitted by the receipt of the proceeds of any judgment which fills
or replenishes the coffer from which that support must be paid.
For our purpose it makes no difference whether her interest in
the family assets is a property interest, or a claim, or even a moral
obligation on the part of the husband which shows promise of
being fulfilled. In either situation her position is bettered when
the financial source by which she lives is enhanced.
Of course it might be contended that so long as she has no
property interest in the judgment funds which go to the husband,
4. This is the majority view in common law jurisdictions. See, for
example, Newton v. Weber, 119 Misc. 240, 196 N.Y. Supp. 113 (1922). Prosser,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 903, 907.
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they may never be needed or expended for her benefit; whereas
if she owns an interest in them, the mere acquisition of owner-
ship constitutes a benefit without more ado. This appears to be
a distinction without meaning from the viewpoint of determining
how far a policy of ethics is to be limited; for the husband may
squander the community through his power of management, just
as he may dissipate his personal assets at common law. Certainly
the community property system was not devised to alter so basic-
ally common notions of right and wrong that prevail every-
where.
Although the proceeds of the judgment may enter the com-
munity, said the court, this is not enough to preclude relief. Thus,
even the acquisition of a property interest by the tortious spouse
does not violate the public policy urged by the defendant. The
community must be enriched, and this effect is not achieved
where the amount of the damages merely replaces a loss which
the community has previously suffered or will suffer in the
future. This distinction between enrichment and recoupment is
certain to give rise to the confusion. Perhaps it is true that by
receiving damages for the loss of past salary the community is
no better off than if the accident had not happened. But suppose
that the damages were not to be received-wouldn't the com-
munity then be in a worse position? And does it not follow that
the award of such damages is a real benefit to both participants
in the community? All that has been previously said with ref-
erence to salary applies equally to damages awarded for disability
or loss of earning power. The commonly accepted definition of
enrichment includes the saving of a loss as well as the aggran-
disement of assets.'
By holding that damages for pain and suffering do not enrich
the community the court completely broke down the concept of
enrichment that it had erected. It stated that these elements bear
directly on the ability of the husband to make a living. But if
they are to be regarded as an item of disability, why were they
not so included? Was nothing being paid him merely because
he suffered? Pain and suffering are usually regarded as items of
damage independent from loss of earnings, and such damages
are given indiscriminately to earners and non-earners alike. If
damages for pain and suffering do not enrich the community, it
is impossible to conceive of any damages that would have such
an effect.
5. A.L.I.,. Restatement of Restitution (1937) § 1, comment b.
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Are we to conclude, then, that no damages received by either
spouse in a personal injury action will operate to enrich the com-
munity? If so, we can happily dismiss the case merely as a cir-
cuitous approach to the desirable conclusion that one spouse may
sue the insurer of the other in tort. Under such a view our only
criticism is that the court should have concluded simply that
the public policy argument proferred by the defendant is not
controlling.
Unfortunately, this conclusion is not at all clear. The court
restricted itself to the items claimed in the particular case by the
particular plaintiff, who was regularly employed at the time of
the injury. Suppose that he were not supporting the family,
although he were capable of doing so? Or suppose that Mrs.
McHenry had been injured by her husband, and* that she was
working at the time, but planned to retire soon to her household
duties? Would these be cases where the damages would amount
to an enrichment, and hence would afford a valid ground for the
refusal of recovery?
One further question remains. Suppose that one spouse were
injured through the negligence of a third person, but the negli-
gence of the other spouse contributed to the injury. Although
the court has made clear that the contributory negligence of one
spouse is not to be imputed to the other, the question of enrich-
ment of the community still remains. This situation had been
presented to the court in the earlier case, Vitale v. Checker Cab
Company.8 In that case, however, the negligent husband was
killed in the accident. Hence his enrichment was not involved,
and the question turned entirely on imputed negligence, which
was easily disposed of.
The writer suggests that in such cases the problem of en-
richment is not present, because the defendant tortfeasor will be
entitled to contribution against the husband (whether he actually
claims contribution would seem to be immaterial). This would
appear to work a fair enough adjustment, even though the hus-
band may still benefit by participating in the remaining half of
the judgment. After all, he .will have been punished for being
a bad man, which seems to be the important thing for the court.
For this reason, if for no other, the recent court of appeal decision
in Kientz v. Charles Dennery, Incorporated,7 appears to reach an
undesirable conclusion.
6. 166 La. 527, 117 So. 579 (1928).
7. 17 So. (2d) 506 (La App. 1944), noted in (1944) 19 Tulane L. Rev. 456.
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Negligence
Although conduct that violates a statute is generally regarded
as being negligent, this does not apply where the harm suffered
was not of the kind which the statute was intended, in general,
to prevent." For this reason, in the case, Picou v. J. B. Luke's
Sons," the mother of a boy who was over fourteen but under
sixteen years of age was not allowed to recover for her son's
death which was occasioned while he was employed by defen-
dant in violation of a statute ° prohibiting the employment of
such minors without the consent of either the parent or the
superintendent of schools. The clear purpose of this act was to
assure that the employment of school children would have a
minimum harmful effect on their educational progress. The stat-
ute was not a personal safety measure. The court stated that the
violation of the statute was not the cause of the mishap. Perhaps
a happier choice of language would have avoided causation and
would have rested the issue properly on legislative policy.
The observation has been made that res ipsa loquitur is not
appropriate as a rule for the construction of pleadings."' In de-
termining whether an exception of no cause of action should be
sustained the courts require the use of a more liberal technique
than is afforded by the restrictive rules of res ipsa loquitur. This
proposition was clearly expressed recently by the supreme court
in the case of Gerald v. Standard Oil Company of Louisiana,"
which arose on an exception of no cause of action. Under the
facts as set forth in the petition it appeared likely that if the
plaintiff were to recover, he would be impelled to fall back
upon res ipsa loquitur at the trial. Furthermore, it was not clear
from the facts stated that even resort to that doctrine would save
his case. The true implications to be drawn from the occurrence
could not be gathered until the available testimony had been
presented. However, since it seemed not unlikely that the occur-
rence of the accident when properly enlarged upon by the evi-
dence might give rise to an implication of negligence, the court
noted this fact as a reason for allowing the case to proceed
to trial. It expressed its position in unequivocal language as fol-
lows:
8. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 1, at 269, § 39.
9. 204 La. 881, 16 So.(2d) 466 (1943).
10. La. Act 301 of 1908, § 1, as amended by La. Act 167 of 1932, § 2
[Dart's Stats. (1941) § 4319].
11. Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference-A Discussion of
the Louisiana Cases (1941) 4 LOUISANA LAW Rsvinw 70, 92.
12. 204 La. 690, 16 So.(2d) 233 (1944).
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"The controversy is one in which the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is possible of application; however, it is not necessary
to hold at this time, and we do not so hold, that such doc-
trine is applicable." 13
In the past the Louisiana courts have used the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine indiscriminately both as a rule of pleading and
as a rule to determine the sufficiency of evidence.14 This prac-
tice has given rise to much confusion.
The liberal approach which is proper in the construction of
pleadings is usually inappropriate in making a final determina-
tion of the controversy. It follows that when pleading cases are
urged upon the courts as precedents for the use of res ipsa
loquitur in determining the sufficiency of evidence, the result is
often embarrassing, and the courts are forced to draw tenuous
and often unsound distinctions. It is to be hoped that the courts
will adhere to the wise procedure of the instant decision and
make clear that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of pleading,
although noting at the same time that the fact that the doctrine
may later become available on trial is a sound reason for dis-
missing the exception of no cause of action.
Controversies resulting from falls in motion picture theaters
usually present close questions on the alleged negligence of the
proprietor. It is impossible to run such an establishment suc-
cessfully and maintain at the same time sufficient lighting to
avoid accidents. Small defects in construction which usually
would not endanger the safety of patrons assume a substantially
hazardous aspect because of the low lighting in which the movie
house must operate.' Although the decisions differ in the lan-
guage used to explain the standard of care imposed upon the
proprietor, the outcome of these cases is frequently determined
through resort to the standard practices of theater construc-
tion.15 If the theater is no darker than the mine run of similar
establishments and the construction of the theater conforms in all
pertinent details with accepted practices, the plaintiff will not
13. 204 La. 690, 699, 16 So.(2d) 233, 236.
14. In the following cases, among others, res ipsa loquitur was used as
a rule to construe the pleadings: Costello v. Morrison Cafeteria Co. of Lou-
isiana, 18 La. App. 40, 135 So. 245 (1931); Urban Land Co. v. City of Shreve-
port, 182 La. 978, 162 So. 747 (1935); Auzenne v. Gulf Public Service Co., 181
So. 54 (La. App. 1938); Bentz v. Saenger-Ehrlich Enterprises, 197 So. 659 (La.
App. 1940).
15. See Dire v. Balaban and Katz, 241 Ill. App. 199, 203 (1926); Rosston
v. Sullivan, 278 Mass. 31, 35, 179 N.E. 173, 175 (1932); Falk v. Stanley Fabian
Corp., 115 N. J. Law 141, 142, 178 Atl. 740, 741 (1935).
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likely recover. This result usually follows because, as a rule,
theater architects have attempted to profit from previous mis-
takes and to avoid for their clients the risk of mishaps whenever
possible.
But the adoption of standard practices does not afford a
guarantee against recovery if the court can appreciate that a
particular hazard could have been avoided without undue ex-
pense or trouble. The opinion of experts and the resort to custom
are likely to control the disposition of the controversy only when
the judge has reason to distrust his own lay opinion. For this
reason, courts are usually careful to emphasize that conformity
to accepted standards is not conclusive proof that reasonable care
has been used. In Cassanova v. Paramount-Richards Theatres,
Incorporated,1" the supreme court again made this clear, and
allowed a recovery for a fall which resulted from a defect so
obvious and so easily remediable that the court was not willing
to excuse defendant on the ground that other respectable theater
owners were currently making the same mistake.
The court's appreciation of the defect and its conviction
that the accident could easily have been avoided led it to lay
down a broad rule excluding testimony that no similar mishap
had occurred previously in the establishment. It is believed that
the decision went further than was necessary. The only con-
ceivable objection to testimony of this kind is the fact that its
probative value may often be doubtful. For example, the fact
that a defendant motorist has never previously had an accident
at a street intersection is hardly persuasive of his having used
due care on any particular occasion. On the other hand, the
fact that a theater has been in continuous operation for a period
of several years under conditions virtually identical with those
attendant at the time of the accident, that during this, period
hundreds of thousands of patrons had escaped mishap-all this
is highly persuasive of the fact that the alleged defect did not
constitute an appreciable hazard to the safety of patrons. Such
testimony should be receivable whenever the court feels that
it may have substantial probative value, and it should be rejected
when the converse appears likely. No hard and fast rule of ex-
clusion such as was laid down in the Cassanova case is desirable.17
Particularly is this true in Louisiana where possible jury mis-
apprehensions of this type of evidence are most unlikely.
16. 204 La. 813, 6 So.(2d) 444 (1943).
17. 1 Shearman & Redfield, A Treatise on the Law of Negligence (rev.
ed. 1941) § 59.
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This ruling gave rise to a rehearing in which the court per-
haps retreated from its previous uncompromising position. It
explained that even in the light of the excluded testimony the
negligence of the defendant appeared to be clear. This conclu-
sion was fair enough, but the court failed to state whether it pro-
posed to retain or to reject the rule announced on the first hear-
ing. As a result, the opinion on rehearing merely beclouded
doubtful law with confusion.
The court recently had occasion to discuss the liability of a
landlord for the defective condition of those portions of the leased
premises over which he has retained possession and which are
maintained for the use and convenience of all tenants. That such
liability exists has been affirmed many times in Louisiana and
elsewhere."8 The only point which might be considered as note-
worthy in the latest case, Bates v. Blitz, 9 is the fact that it was
not clear that the landlord had erected the defective structure
(a platform in the courtyard of a tenement house). Neverthe-
less, the court correctly pointed out that the dangerous portion
of the premises was in his possession, and that reasonable care
to inspect and either remove or repair was imposed upon him.
The conflicting interests of two of Louisiana's chief indus-
tries was before the supreme court in the highly interesting case,
Doucet v. Texas Company.20 The defendant oil company, during
the course of its drilling operations deposited large quantities of
oil well brine and petroleum in surrounding coastal waters.
These materials were carried to the waters in which plaintiff
operated his oyster beds. Shortly thereafter the oysters died and
plaintiff's industry was substantially injured. It appears that
at least four major issues were involved: (1) Did the defendant
cause oil and refuse to be deposited in the waters? (2) Did this
material spread in substantial quantities to the more distant
waters covering the plaintiff's oyster beds? (3) Did the substances
so carried cause the death of the oysters? (4) Was the defen-
dant's conduct wrongful as being negligent toward the plain-
tiff's interests?
The answers to the first two issues came readily enough,
although there was some little conflict in the testimony. As to
the third issue, the court presented an excellent condensation of
the voluminous record of scientific testimony and the results
18. Glain v. Sparandeo, 119 La. 339, 44 So. 120 (1907); Mosher v. Burglass,
170 So. 416 (La. App. 1936).
19. 205 La. 536, 17 So.(2d) 816 (1944).
20. 205 La. 312, 17 So.(2d) 340 (1944).
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of extensive biological experiments. Although the experts who
testified were by no means in complete accord, there was ample
evidence to justify the court's conclusion that the presence of
oil in the quantities found above the oyster beds impaired the
ability of the oysters to absorb nourishment from the water and
resulted eventually in starvation.
The issue of the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct
was dealt with more sparingly than the other questions of the
controversy. The court was satisfied that some of the oil escaped
through carelessness on the part of the pumper or gauger, and
that leaks developed in the pipes. One might conjecture whether
such a case as this really rests upon negligence, or whether the
trespassory nature of the invasion, or theories of nuisance, might
not be employed if necessary so as to impose an insurer's respon-
sibility.
III. PROCEDURE
ROBERT I. BROUSSARD*
Appeals and Appellate Procedure
In Mistich v. Holman' plaintiff petitioned for a suspensive
appeal and requested permission to file a statement of facts at
any time before the return day of the appeal, reserving to the
defendant the right to file a statement 'of facts. The plaintiff
could not get the defendant to draft jointly a statement of facts.2
The plaintiff thereupon asked the trial judge to make a statement
according to his recollection of the facts pursuant to Article 603
of the Code of Practice. The trial judge refused, stating that he
was without authority to do so after the signing of the order of
appeal, and on the further ground that the chief deputy clerk of
court was without authority to extend the period of time fixed
by law for making a statement of facts. The supreme court, on
appeal, held that once an order of appeal has been granted and
the, appeal bond signed, the appeal is perfected, and the trial
court is divested of jurisdiction, except the right to test the suffi-
ciency of the appeal bond as of the date when filed. Also, that
*Student, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. 205 La. 171, 17 So. (2d) 23 (1944).
2. Art. 602, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
